
Beyond the Explanatory Gap: Why Consciousness Requires a Reconceptualization of Epistemic Foundations Rather Than New Physics
Abstract The Hard Problem of consciousness persists not due to ontological irreducibility but because contemporary epistemology privileges third-person empirical justification over first-person phenomenological warrant, creating an artificial explanatory gap. This paper argues that consciousness should be reconceptualized as fundamentally an epistemological rather than metaphysical problem. By examining how empiricist frameworks systematically marginalize introspection and subjective experience as legitimate sources of justification, we demonstrate that the apparent explanatory gap reflects a methodological incommensurability between incompatible epistemic frameworks rather than evidence for dualism or panpsychism. We propose reconstituting epistemology to integrate first-person phenomenological warrant alongside third-person observation as co-equal justificatory sources. Through analysis of classical consciousness arguments—including Jackson’s Knowledge Argument and Nagel’s subjective character thesis—we show how this epistemological integration dissolves the Hard Problem while maintaining physicalism. This approach avoids both reductive eliminativism and metaphysical speculation by recognizing that consciousness explanations require methodological pluralism. We conclude that resolving the consciousness puzzle requires not new physics but rather epistemic humility: acknowledging that subjective experience provides irreducible warrant for understanding consciousness itself, and that legitimate scientific explanation must accommodate multiple, non-reducible sources of justification appropriate to their respective domains. ...








