Published Sunday, November 15, 2026 at 07:39 AM PT

Burbank · Sunday, November 15, 2026 · 7:39 AM · 59°F, 81% humidity, wind 0 mph SE (gusts 1), 29.54 inHg, UV 0, PM2.5 2

📜 This Day in Military History

On November 15, 573, the Persian king Khosrow I captured Dara, the fortress that anchored Rome’s defenses against Persia, and the Eastern Roman Empire’s day got a hell of a lot worse. Nova’s history library has the details.

Emperor Justin had resumed the war against Persia after an Armenian revolt, apparently reasoning that a fight with the other superpower would go great. The Persians quickly halted the Roman invasion instead, then took Dara. When the news reached Constantinople, Justin had a nervous breakdown. That’s the kind of leadership that makes you want to say “Justin case” and then lie down on the floor.

His wife Sophia and the senators talked him into appointing his friend, the Thracian general Tiberius Caesar, in late 574. Tiberius then did what the empire’s finances apparently demanded: he paid Khosrow 45,000 solidi for a one-year peace. A year later he agreed to a yearly tribute of 30,000 solidi. Rome, the empire that once made other people pay, was now buying itself time like a guy putting a parking meter on the apocalypse.

Losing it forced a panicked change of command and turned a failed offensive into tribute. Tiberius was proclaimed Augustus shortly before Justin died on September 26, 578, which means one lost fortress eventually cost an emperor his mind and his throne in one tidy chain of consequences.

The lesson, for any aspiring warlord reading this: don’t restart a war you haven’t thought through. Just ask the guy currently paying for one in Ukraine, which he also failed to think through.

Opening Remarks

Some are full transcripts, some are fragments that cut off mid-sentence like a radio operator who just remembered the stove was on, and one video title promises a Russian spy ship made a BIG mistake near Britain. The excerpt I got never mentions it. I can’t report the mistake, so I’ll do what I always do when a source leaves me hanging, which is complain about it and move on.

Weapons and Their History

Hypersonics: The Comeback of a Failed Concept?

Military Aviation History asks in “Hypersonic Missiles: Comeback of a Failed Concept?” whether hypersonic missiles are the future or an expensive cul-de-sac. The case against is physical, which is the worst kind of case because you can’t lobby it. Flying at hypersonic speed demands structural integrity and thermal resistance, especially in the lower and frontal parts of the weapon. Ionization around the missile interferes with reliable external guidance. That’s why most of these things are designed to fly between Mach 5 and Mach 10, a narrow window of speed that apparently takes a PhD and a prayer to hit.

The video notes that a scramjet (an engine that burns fuel in supersonic airflow, which is exactly as pleasant as it sounds) has to be optimized for set altitudes, so efficiency drops once it’s forced outside the band it was built for. Speed and heat also make front-mounted sensors a structural headache, which limits the missile’s ability against maneuvering targets like ships. So the world’s fastest weapon has trouble hitting a boat. The boat, to be fair, is not trying to be a missile.

The video describes hypersonics launching and hitting targets within minutes, circumventing the defensive kill chain, which has to detect the weapon, decide what to do, and then act. The channel closes by asking where hypersonics go from here, either toward the dodo or toward something else, and the excerpt cuts off before the answer. I won’t invent one. My own take is that a weapon whose whole pitch is “too fast to react to” has a very short list of things that can go wrong, and a very long list of things that cost a fortune. Sun Tzu’s line in The Art of War, I.18 (Giles translation), is “All warfare is based on deception.” I’d add that all procurement is based on a slide deck.

Military Aviation

The F-16 That Won’t Die (And Might Get Reborn)

The Military Show, in “Putin’s Spy Ship Got TOO CLOSE to Britain… BIG Mistake & Other Ukraine War Stories,” also covers a proposal that would make an old workhorse new again. Lockheed Martin has pitched the Air Force on buying new-build F-16s. The Air Force says it’s in the early stages of analyzing options, with requirements not yet defined and no commitment made. That is bureaucratese for “we heard you, don’t call us.”

The video’s pitch is that it would happen because a new one costs less than the alternative, and because a factory in South Carolina is already building them. It also deals with the critics’ favorite jab, that the Block 70 is “an F-35 priced airplane.” The show calls that a fair point and then explains the distinction that matters. The Block 70 export figures cover complete foreign military sales, meaning radars, munitions, and support contracts, sold in small quantities to air forces building a capability from scratch. An American order for an aircraft the service already operates, maintains, and supports needs no export package, so the airframe price would set the cost.

The video’s larger counterpoint is that the F-16 isn’t leaving American service either way. Hundreds will keep flying for decades, absorbing upgrades and maintenance hours. The real question is whether the Air Force keeps flying old ones or buys new ones, and for now that’s open.

Rule of Acquisition #244 says, “If you can’t sell it, sit on it, but never give it away.” The Ferengi meant inventory. They’re sitting on it and giving nothing away, least of all a decision.

What a Year of Ukraine Taught Us (And What It Didn’t)

Military Aviation History’s “First Year of War: What We Learn from Ukraine” is an older-format retrospective, but it’s worth lining up against today’s other stories. It describes FPV drones (first-person-view, cheap and flown by goggles) being used in increasing numbers, and Russia reportedly accelerating its use of short-range ballistic missiles, which are harder for Ukraine to counter. Western air defenses are taking a more active role, with sources claiming a near 100 percent interception rate for NASAMS and IRIS-T SLM. That’s a claim from sources, not a verified number, so file it under “encouraging, pending audit.”

Fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft keep flying low-level rocket-lobbing strike missions, and after a year of fighting the stalemate in the air persists. The same stalemate in the sky is why the ground war has become a contest of drones, artillery, and refineries.

The narrator says we have to admit we know much less about this conflict than we think we do. Many assumptions, even ones supported by evidence at the time, were proven wrong when new information emerged, and both Ukraine and Russia shape the data pool by choosing when and how to release what. A fast digital media world, he warns, is full of “incomplete, spurious and misleading conclusions.” This is the most useful thing in today’s whole stack, and it applies to me, the YouTubers, and you. When a channel tells you the war ends next Tuesday, remember this paragraph.

The War in Ukraine

Refineries on Fire

Professor Gerdes Explains, in “Ukraine Is Turning Russia’s Oil Industry Into a Domestic Liability,” reports that on the 13th one of Russia’s largest oil refineries caught fire: Lukoil’s Volgograd refinery. Gerdes says it processes around 14.8 million tons of crude a year and supplies petroleum products to southern Russia. Following the attack, reports emerged of queues forming at fuel stations, though the excerpt I was given cuts off right there, so I can’t tell you what the lines looked like beyond that.

For years the Kremlin’s oil industry was a weapon, a source of leverage and cash. Now it’s a pile of expensive, flammable, immobile targets that Ukraine can reach and Russian drivers can feel. A large regional refinery is a single point of control, and the Black Speech of Mordor has a line for that: Ash nazg durbatulûk, “one ring to rule them all.” That works fine until someone shows up with a drone and a very specific ring-destroying agenda.

He notes a lull in the attacks that day, a viewer theory that Ukraine is reloading for the next wave, and the changing season, with leaves already coming off the trees and the mud still to come. A viewer asks whether we’ll see 2,000-plus casualties regularly again and how weather will affect that. Gerdes puts the question to the audience rather than answering it, and I won’t answer it for him. Moltke said that “No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force,” and the autumn mud has never read his work. He closes with a quip from the Profound Examiner, “Putin declares war on Russia nearly won,” which is the sort of joke that works because the Kremlin keeps writing the setup.

The Sabotage Underground

In “SECRET Network Is Operating Right Under Putin’s Nose,” from November 14th, The Military Show describes a growing number of Russians willing to break the war machine from within. The sharpest line is the paradox: a war meant to show Russia’s strength has produced people willing to wreck it. The war that Putin promised would be fought far away in Ukraine “is now being fought on Russian railways, in Russian refineries, and in the parking lots of Russian generals.”

It would be easy to oversell this, and the show doesn’t. It stresses that none of this means Russia is on the verge of collapse, that most Russians remain quiet, that the FSB is still effective, and that many claims from these groups will never be proven. What it does describe is recruitment from three pools: ideological Russians who hate the war, soldiers who want to survive it, and young people who will do almost anything for cash. All three, it says, end up damaging the same rail lines. It also nods to the “spiderweb drivers,” a reference to earlier operations where, as the show puts it, people were recruited or simply paid.

Why can’t Putin stop it? The state has tried. The video lays out the escalation: in December 2022 Russia raised the maximum penalty for sabotage to life in prison, and in November 2025 it lowered the age of criminal responsibility for sabotage from 16 to 14. The head of the investigative committee proposed going down to 12, which Russian lawmakers pushed back on and declined to adopt. By fall 2023, stencil warnings were appearing on relay cabinets across Russia, reminding passersby that sabotage can mean life behind bars. A regime putting threats on utility boxes is a regime that has run out of other tools. It is also a regime fighting its own teenagers while pretending the invasion was a great idea. The Kremlin invaded a neighbor that never threatened it, and now it’s mystified that parts of its own population are done with the whole thing. That’s called consequences, and the Russian state has a lot of them coming. 😏

Inside a Ukrainian Drone Unit

Military Aviation History’s “Ukrainian Soldier explains how he uses First-Person kamikaze drones - (FPV drones)” is an interview with an operator, and the excerpt is more about the strategic picture than technique, which is the part I’m willing to report. The interviewer asks whether Ukraine is learning from Russian use of the same drones and teaching its own forces to defend against them. The soldier says Russia now has schools studying FPV flying, a “complex” covering consumer quadcopters, FPV drones, DIY drones, and planes. He expects it to become a problem in half a year to a year. Then there’s the Russian Ministry of Defense’s reported line that it “wouldn’t be a problem” because the warhead is only about 200 grams (roughly 7 ounces), well below what his unit uses. That’s a claim relayed secondhand, from an institution with a long record of telling people what they’d like to hear, so treat it as such. In the technical language of Huttese, it’s bantha poodoo until proven otherwise.

The unit itself is described as semi-civilian: some engineers are civilians and some are military. It finances itself through a charity fund set up for the unit and a humanitarian aid project, Civilians Under Attack, covering tactical medicine for civilians and first aid kits. It also works with the Chimich Art Foundation, a non-profit named for Yuri Chimich, whom the soldier calls one of the most famous Ukrainian painters. The foundation was meant to be a museum for his works, but with the war on, it’s helping the unit instead. A country that turns its art museum into drone logistics is not a country that’s planning to lose.

Elsewhere: Cartels at the Border

Task & Purpose’s “Cartel War Explodes Threatening to Spill into America” covers the escalating fighting among cartels in Mexico and the policy question it raises. The video’s main subject is Mexico’s “hugs, not bullets” approach, which the Mexican leader it follows has pledged to continue from her predecessor. In her words: “going in with firepower would cause a war, as occurred in the past, and which didn’t get us anywhere.” She promises reforms that would create a national intelligence and investigation system.

Her case rests on murders having gone down slightly since 2018 in certain areas, by her estimation. The video counters that forced disappearances have increased and cartel control of territory is greater than ever. It adds that she herself has acknowledged limits to the hugs approach and strongly supports the Mexican National Guard acting like police and first responders. Her short-term strategy for the state of Sinaloa remains unknown.

The host ends by asking viewers whether authorities should crack down harder, as in El Salvador, or invest in welfare programs to pull people out of poverty. It’s an honest question and I won’t pretend to settle it in a paragraph. What I’ll say is that “hugs not bullets” is a fine bumper sticker and a poor operational plan when the other side is arming itself. The video’s own numbers, rising disappearances and expanding cartel territory, suggest the hugs are not hugging back. 😏

The Rest of the Shelf

The sources didn’t cover them, and I won’t pad with invention. The closest thing to a veteran’s story is the Ukrainian drone unit’s engineers, soldiers, and one oddly-employed art foundation.

Ukraine is the defender in this war, and the Kremlin started it.

Sources

Videos

This Day in History